Your corporate platform for all your Process Safety studies and safety knowledge.

  • From fragmented data to knowledge.
  • From inconsistent methods to a customised backbone.
  • From repeated data entry to traceable history.

PHA Container brings PHA studies, history and company knowledge into one corporate structure. Process Safety Expert is the analysis environment operating inside that structure.

Process Safety ExpertYour Process Safety standards and culture embedded in PHA software.

Not a generic PHA tool: a working environment configured around your own Process Safety methodologies. Whoever facilitates or leads, methodology and quality standards remain consistent.

Methods per IEC 61882 (HAZOP), the CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (What-If, checklist), ISO 17776 (HAZID), IEC 60812 and AIAG (FMEA); alarm rationalization per ISA-18.2 and IEC 62682; risk register per ISO 31000.

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What this means technically. Risk matrices, severity and likelihood definitions, acceptance criteria, terminology, company standards, checklists, mandatory questions, decision criteria and LOPA/IPL rules can be configured at company level.

The purpose is not simply to customise screens. The company methodology becomes part of the study workflow itself, so a change of facilitator does not require a change of process-safety discipline.

Editable severity by likelihood risk matrix with SIL per cell

One connected data chainFrom HAZOP to revalidation without rediscovery.

The same scenario and decision context is reused across the PHA stages, and past scenarios, safeguard decisions, recommendations and closures stay connected in one knowledge chain.

HAZOP→Scenario→LOPA→SIF→SIL verification→Action→Closure→Revalidation

HAZOP per IEC 61882, LOPA per the CCPS guidelines, SIL selection and verification per IEC 61511 and IEC 61508, bow-ties per the CCPS concept book.

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A scenario developed during HAZOP can become the basis of a LOPA. A SIF requirement identified through that analysis can continue into SIL verification. A recommendation remains associated with the scenario that generated it and with its subsequent action and closure.

Five years later, the next PHA team can see what was previously evaluated, the assumptions used, why safeguards or IPLs were credited, which recommendations were generated, how they were closed, and what has changed since the previous study.

The technical objective is not only less repeated data entry. It is preservation of the engineering decision context, assumptions and traceability between each stage, so the Container is not a larger archive but the relationships required to understand the previous engineering basis.

LOPA worksheet for a hazard scenario with initiating event, protection layers and target frequencies

Across the organisationWhat one plant learns can create value across the organisation.

Multi-site benchmarking · corporate best practices · standardised methodology.

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For multi-site organisations, structured PHA information can make recurring scenarios, safeguards, IPL decisions, equipment-specific findings and recommendations visible across studies.

This does not mean that a conclusion from Plant A automatically applies to Plant B. Plant-specific process conditions and safeguards still require engineering review. The value is that relevant previous experience can be found and considered rather than remaining buried in historical reports.

HAZOP worksheet for a deviation: causes, consequences, safeguards and recommendations in one table

PHA CopilotStructured corporate knowledge first.

Structured data→Corporate knowledge→PHA Copilot

The Copilot is not the decision-maker; it is a support layer for the facilitator, grounded in the company's own Process Safety history.

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Ontology, taxonomy and structured data come first. With sufficient validated history, an assistance layer may retrieve similar causes, consequences, safeguards, historical IPL decisions and comparable scenarios for facilitator review.

Scenario credibility, safeguard adequacy, IPL validity and risk acceptability remain decisions of the multidisciplinary PHA team. The usefulness of the Copilot therefore depends on the quality, consistency and traceability of the underlying process-safety data.

SIL verification of a safety instrumented function: PFD, RRF, MTTFS and the PFD curve over the mission time

Integrated process safetyFrom the hazard study to the documents the authority reads.

The same scenarios, substances and equipment feed the major-accident documents of BEKRA and Seveso III, the hazardous area classification of ATEX and the Explosion Protection Document — each prepared according to its text, with every clause one click away.

  • BEKRARegulation 30702 and its four communiqués
  • Seveso IIIDirective 2012/18/EU, CLP Regulation 1272/2008
  • ATEXIEC 60079-10-1, IEC 60079-10-2, IEC 60079-14, IEC 60079-0, EN 1127-1
  • Explosion Protection DocumentRegulation 28633 (Directive 1999/92/EC), Regulation 29758 (Directive 2014/34/EU)
  • Referencesevery clause a worksheet cites links to its text
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  • BEKRA (Turkey, 2019)The Ek-1 substance register and tier, hazardous equipment with internal and external hazards, LOPA scenarios against the Article 9 limit of 1E-4 per year with the communiqué's credit rules, and the documents in their prescribed form: the Major Accident Scenario Document, the Safety Report, the Internal Emergency Plan with the Ek-3 contacts and Ek-4 forms, and the Ek-7 intervention card — in Turkish and English.
  • Seveso III (Directive 2012/18/EU)The same registers and tier under the directive's Annex I, and its documents: the Safety Report (Annex II), the Internal Emergency Plan (Annex IV) and the Major Accident Prevention Policy (Art. 8, Annex III). National rules can be added as choices.
  • ATEX hazardous area classificationRelease sources classified per IEC 60079-10-1 for gases and vapours and IEC 60079-10-2 for dusts — release rate, dilution, zone type and extent with the clause behind each number — the EN 1127-1 ignition source assessment, the equipment check per IEC 60079-14 and 60079-0, and the Explosion Protection Document of the Turkish regulation, in Turkish and English.
  • References that stay aliveEvery regulation and standard a study rests on is listed with the clauses applied and the public text; a citation in a worksheet — “Ek-2 §8.3”, “IEC 60079-10-1 Table D.1” — opens its entry.
ATEX zone schedule: release sources with grade, zone, extent and the IEC 60079-10-1 clause behind eachATEX zones drawn on the plot plan with the IEC 60079-10-1 Annex A symbols: zone 0 hexagons, zone 1 cross-hatch, zone 2 single hatch

What changes for your organisationThe operational consequences of keeping studies in one corporate environment.

One source of truth

PHA studies, history and related decisions remain in one corporate environment.

Consistent standard

The same company methodology can be applied across different facilitators and plants.

Less rework

Less repeated data entry and less effort reconstructing historical context.

Multi-site learning

Controlled visibility of relevant experience and best practices across plants.

Future-ready data

Structured data suitable for benchmarking and, later, controlled Copilot support.

Facilitator freedom

The company can choose its experts while retaining its methodology, records and knowledge.

How it is builtThe architecture is part of the process-safety model.

One container per company · browser first · data you own · your standard in code · traceable numbers · standards behind it.

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  • One container per companyProjects, configuration, libraries and history remain within the company's tenant.
  • Browser firstExternal facilitators can be given project-specific access without receiving access to the wider corporate environment.
  • Data ownership and auditabilityStudy information remains exportable, recoverable and auditable, with changes recorded through the lifecycle.
  • Your standard in codeRisk matrices, severity and likelihood scales, categories, checklists, custom data and methodology are configuration that is reused from project to project.
  • Traceable numbersPFD, frequency and SIL calculations retain their calculation model and source, so a later reviewer can understand and reproduce the basis.
  • Reference frameworkIEC 61511, IEC 61882, IEC 60812, ISO 17776, CCPS LOPA and IEC 61508 as project reference standards; the BEKRA regulation and communiqués, Directive 2012/18/EU and CLP, the ATEX regulations, IEC 60079 and EN 1127-1 where a study calls for them — every clause cited in a worksheet links to its text.
  • Studies in the containerHAZOP + LOPA, HAZID, What-If, FMEA, checklist, stand-alone LOPA, SIL selection and verification, alarm rationalization, risk register, BEKRA and Seveso III documents, ATEX hazardous area classification and Explosion Protection Document, action items, SRS and Design SRS, proof tests and lifecycle cost.
A page of the HAZOP study report generated as a Word document

About usDeveloped by the engineers through extensive hands-on PHA experience.

PROCEEX draws on more than 20 years of chemical and process engineering experience, including oil & gas and multidisciplinary industrial projects, together with more than 1,000 hours of hands-on PHA facilitation.

A PHA is not only a worksheet produced during a meeting. It is a record of scenarios considered, assumptions made, safeguards evaluated, decisions taken and actions generated by a multidisciplinary team.

The system is being developed to maintain those relationships throughout the process-safety lifecycle and to keep the resulting engineering knowledge under the organisation's control.

From PHA software to Process Safety Infrastructure.

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An engineer in blue coveralls, helmet and safety glasses walking through a plant